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1 Introduction
We consider the division of some perfectly divisible commodity among a
group of agents with single-peaked preferences. This means that each agent
has a most preferred amount, his peak amount, below which and above
which his welfare is decreasing. A typical example is rationing in a two-good
exchange economy when prices are in disequilibrium (e.g., Benassy, 1982): if
the preferences of the agents over the two-dimensional space of bundles are
strictly convex, then the restrictions of these preferences to the budget lines
are single-peaked. In this context Benassy (1982) considered the uniform
rationing scheme. For the more general class of division problems with
single-peaked preferences, this solution is known as the uniform rule.
Sprumont (1991) initiated the axiomatic analysis of this class of prob-
lems. Since then a wide literature has been concerned with the search
for rules with appealing properties. Central axioms in this analysis are
axioms of fairness, non-manipulability, monotonicity, and consistency; see
for instance Ching (1992,1994), Dagan (1995), So¨nmez (1994), and Thom-
son (1994a,b,1995,1997).1 An important conclusion of this research is that
the uniform rule is now accepted as the most important rule for allocation
problems with single-peaked preferences.2
In a recent article Chun (2001) considers separability for economies with
single-peaked preferences: When comparing two economies that are defined
over the same set of agents, separability requires the following. If each agent
in a subgroup has the same preference relation in both economies and the
total amount assigned to this subgroup is the same in both economies, then
the amounts assigned to each agent in the subgroup should be the same
in both economies. Separability was introduced by Moulin (1987) in the
context of surplus sharing and Chun (1999,2000) studies it in the contexts
of bankruptcy and quasi-linear choice.
For economies with single-peaked preferences Chun (2001, Theorem 1)
proves that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality,
no-envy, separability, and Ω-continuity. We obtain an alternative character-
ization by using a weak replication-invariance condition, called duplication-
invariance, instead of Ω-continuity (Theorem 2). Furthermore, we prove
(Lemma 2) that Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and separa-
bility imply no-envy. Chun (2001, Theorem 1), Theorem 2, and Lemma 2
together imply that the uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto op-
1This list of references is not exhaustive.
2See Klaus (1998) and Thomson (forthcoming) for surveys.
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timality, equal division lower bound, separability, and either Ω-continuity
(Corollary 2) or duplication-invariance (Corollary 3).
2 Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences and
Properties of Rules
The purpose of this note is to add a variation of Chun’s (2001, Theorem 1)
characterization of the uniform rule and strengthen Chun’s (2001, Theo-
rem 2) characterization of the uniform rule. Hence, for further motivation
and references with respect to economies with single-peaked preferences and
their solutions we refer to Chun (2001). In this section we introduce the
problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked and properties
for rules (see also Chun (2001), Sections 2 and 3).
Let I ≡ {1, 2, . . .} be an (infinite) universe of “potential” agents and N
be the collection of nonempty and finite subsets of I containing at least
three agents.3 Given N ∈ N , each agent i ∈ N has continuous and
single-peaked preferences Ri defined over the non-negative real numbers R+.
Single-peakedness of Ri means that there exists a point p(Ri) ∈ R+, called
agent i’s peak amount, with the following property: for all zi, z′i ∈ R+ such
that eitherzi < z′i ≤ p(Ri) or zi > z′i ≥ p(Ri), z′i Pi zi.4 Let R be the class
of all continuous, single-peaked preferences over R+ and RN be the set of
preference profiles R = (Ri)i∈N such that for all i ∈ N , Ri ∈ R.
Now, an economy can be formalized as follows. Let Ω ∈ R+ be the
amount of an infinitely divisible commodity, the (social) endowment, that
has to be distributed among the agents in N ∈ N with preference profile
R ∈ RN .5 Thus, e = (R,Ω) ∈ RN × R+ denotes an economy. Let EN =
RN × R+ be the class of all economies for N ∈ N and E =
⋃
N EN be the
class of all economies. A feasible allocation for e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN is a vector
x ∈ RN+ such that
∑
N xi = Ω. An (allocation) rule is a function ϕ that
assigns to every e ∈ E a feasible allocation, denoted ϕ(e). Given e ∈ EN and
i ∈ N , ϕi(e) is the allotment of agent i.
We impose the following properties of rules.
Pareto optimality: For all N ∈ N and e ∈ EN , there is no feasible allo-
cation x such that for all i ∈ N , xiRi ϕi(e) and for some j ∈ N , xj Pj ϕj(e).
3Since for any N ∈ N such that |N | = 2, our main property of separability is vacuously
satisfied, we require |N | ≥ 3 for all N ∈ N .
4Pi denotes the strict preference relation associated with Ri.
5Note that free disposal of the commodity is not allowed.
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Pareto optimality is equivalent to same-sidedness (Sprumont, 1991): for all
N ∈ N and e ∈ EN , either [for all i ∈ N , ϕi(e) ≤ p(Ri)] or [for all i ∈ N ,
ϕi(e) ≥ p(Ri)]).
By no-envy (Foley, 1967) no agent strictly prefers the allotment of an-
other agent to his own allotment.
No-envy: For all N ∈ N , e ∈ EN , and i, j ∈ N , ϕi(e)Ri ϕj(e).
By equal division lower bound each agent (weakly) prefers his allotment
to the “equal division share” of the economy.
Equal Division Lower Bound: For all N ∈ N , e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN , and
i ∈ N , ϕi(e)Ri Ω|N | .
Our next property, called separability, requires that if for two economies
with the same set of agents each agent in a subgroup has the same preference
relation in both economies and the total amount assigned to this subgroup
is the same in both economies, then the allotments of each agent in the
subgroup should be the same in both economies.
Let M ⊆ N . Then, for all R ∈ RN , RM ≡ (Ri)i∈M .
Separability: For all N ∈ N , e = (R,Ω), e′ = (R′,Ω′) ∈ EN , andM ⊆ N ,
if RM = R′M and ΣMϕi(e) = ΣMϕi(e
′), then for all i ∈M , ϕi(e) = ϕi(e′).
By Ω-continuity small changes in the social endowment cause small
changes in the allocation chosen by the rule.
Ω-Continuity: For all N ∈ N , e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN , and all sequences
{Ωk}k∈N in R+, if limk→∞Ωk = Ω, then limk→∞ ϕ(R,Ωk) = ϕ(R,Ω).
Replication-invariance states that if an economy is replicated, i.e., the
amount to divide and the preference profile are replicated, then the replica
of the allocation assigned by the rule for the initial economy equals the
allocation assigned by the rule for the replicated economy. Since replication-
invariance is a well-known property and its formal description is somewhat
cumbersome, for a formal statement we refer to Thomson (1995a,1997) or
Chun (2001).
Note that replication-invariance applies to all possible “replica
economies,” that is, the original economy may have been replicated any
number of times. Next we introduce duplication-invariance, a weaker form of
replication-invariance since it is only applied to the duplication of economies.
Let N,N ′ ∈ N such that |N ′| = |N | and N ′ ∩N = ∅ and e = (R,Ω) ∈
EN . We call 2∗ e = ((R,R′), 2Ω) ∈ RN∪N ′×R+ a duplication or a duplicate
economy of e, if for each agent i ∈ N there exists exactly one “clone”
i′ ∈ N ′ such that Ri = R′i′ . Given a feasible allocation x for e, 2 ∗ x denotes
the duplication of x for the duplicate economy 2 ∗ e, that is, any agent
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i ∈ N and his clone receive the same allotment at 2 ∗ e, namely agent i’s
original allotment at e: if i′ ∈ N ′ is the clone of agent i ∈ N in 2 ∗ e, then
(2 ∗ x)i′ = (2 ∗ x)i = xi.
Duplication-Invariance: For all N ∈ N , all e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN , and all
duplicate economies 2 ∗ e of e, ϕ(2 ∗ e) = 2 ∗ ϕ(e).
3 Separability and the Uniform Rule
A rule satisfying all properties introduced in Section 2 is the uniform rule.
It has played a central role in the literature of fair division when preferences
are single-peaked.





N p(Ri) ≥ Ω,
max{p(Rj), λ} if
∑
N p(Ri) ≤ Ω,
where λ solves
∑
N Ui(e) = Ω.
The uniform rule satisfies many axioms of fairness, non-manipulability,
monotonicity, and consistency. Furthermore, various combinations of these
axioms together with Pareto optimality yield characterizations of the uni-
form rule; see for instance Ching (1992,1994), Dagan (1995), So¨nmez (1994),
and Thomson (1994a,b,1995,1997). We state the following lemma without
proof (see Chun, 2001).
Lemma 1. The uniform rule satisfies Pareto optimality, no-envy, equal
division lower bound, separability, Ω-continuity, and duplication-invariance.
In this section we present three characterizations of the uniform rule
that involve separability. First, we state one of Chun’s (2001, Theorem 1)
characterizations of the uniform rule.
Theorem 1. [Chun (2001), Theorem 1] The uniform rule is the only
rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and Ω-continuity.
We obtain an alternative characterization of the uniform rule by using
duplication-invariance instead of Ω-continuity
Theorem 2. The uniform rule is the only rule satisfying Pareto optimality,
no-envy, separability, and duplication-invariance.
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Proof. By Lemma 1, the uniform rule satisfies Pareto optimality, no-
envy, separability, and duplication-invariance. Let ϕ be a solution satis-
fying Pareto optimality, no-envy, separability, and duplication-invariance.
Let e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN and Ω = ∑N p(Ri). By Pareto optimality, for all
i ∈ N , ϕi(e) = p(Ri) = Ui(e).
Case 1: Let e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN , Ω > ΣNp(Ri), and x = ϕ(e). Suppose, by
contradiction, that x 6= U(e). By Pareto optimality and no-envy, there are
two agents, without loss of generality 1, 2 ∈ N , such that
x1 > p(R1) > x2 ≥ p(R2) and x1R1 x2.
Let N ′ ∈ N be such that |N ′| = |N | and N ′ ∩N = ∅. Consider a duplicate
economy 2∗e = ((R,R′), 2Ω) ∈ RN∪N ′×R+ of e. By duplication-invariance,
ϕ(2 ∗ e) = 2 ∗ ϕ(e) = 2 ∗ x. Let y = ϕ(2 ∗ e)(= 2 ∗ x). Hence, since y is a
duplication of x, y1 = x1, y2 = x2, and
y1 > p(R1) > y2 ≥ p(R2) and y1R1 y2.6
Note that |(N ∪N ′)\{1, 2}| is even. Next, we partition the set of agents
(N ∪ N ′)\{1, 2} into two sets of equal size: let N1, N2 ∈ N be such that
N1 ∪N2 = (N ∪N ′)\{1, 2}, N1 ∩N2 = ∅, and |N1| = |N2|.
Let e˜ = (R˜, Ω˜) ∈ RN∪N ′×R+ be the economy obtained from 2∗e by defining
(a) R˜1 = R1, R˜2 = R2, for all i ∈ N1, p(R˜i) = p(R˜1) and y2 P˜i y1, for all
i ∈ N2, p(R˜i) = p(R˜2), and
(b) Ω˜ = |N |(y1 + y2).
Let ϕ(e˜) = y˜. By no-envy and same-sidedness, for all i, j ∈ N1 ∪ {1},
y˜i = y˜j . By no-envy and same-sidedness, for all i, j ∈ N2 ∪ {2}, y˜i = y˜j .
Note that |N | = |N1 ∪ {1}| = |N2 ∪ {2}|. Hence, Ω˜ = |N |(y˜1 + y˜2). Thus,
since Ω˜ = |N |(y1 + y2), y˜1 + y˜2 = y1 + y2. Hence, by separability, y˜1 = y1
and y˜2 = y2. Then, for any agent i ∈ N1, y˜i = y1 and by the definition of
R˜i, y˜2 P˜i y˜i. Hence, any agent i ∈ N1 envies agent 2, a contradiction.
Case 2: Let e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN , Ω < ΣNp(Ri), and x = ϕ(e). Note that we
can apply the same proof technique as in Case 1. However, for economies
with at least four agents, we give an alternative proof that does not require
duplication-invariance. Thus, let |N | ≥ 4.
Suppose, by contradiction, that x 6= U(e). By Pareto optimality and
no-envy, there are two agents, without loss of generality 1, 2 ∈ N , such that
6Note that whenever the number of agents in the original economy e is at least four
and even, we can skip the “duplication step.”
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x1 < p(R1) < x2 ≤ p(R2) and x1R1 x2. Since |N | ≥ 4, there are two agents
in N\{1, 2}, without loss of generality 3, 4 ∈ N\{1, 2}.
Let e˜ = (R˜, Ω˜) ∈ RN × R+ be the economy obtained from e by defining
(a) R˜1 = R1, R˜2 = R2, p(R˜3) = p(R˜1) and x2 P˜3 x1, p(R˜4) = p(R˜2), for
all i ∈ N\{1, 2, 3, 4}, p(R˜i) = 0, and
(b) Ω˜ = 2 (x1 + x2).
Let ϕ(e˜) = x˜. By same-sidedness, for all i ∈ N\{1, 2, 3, 4}, x˜i = p(R˜i) = 0.
By no-envy and same-sidedness, x˜1 = x˜3 and x˜2 = x˜4. Hence, Ω˜ = 2 (x˜1 +
x˜2). Thus, since Ω˜ = 2 (x1+ x2), x˜1+ x˜2 = x1+ x2. Hence, by separability,
x˜1 = x1 and x˜2 = x2. Then, x˜3 = x1 and by the definition of R˜3, x˜2 P˜3 x˜3.
Hence, agent 3 envies agent 2, a contradiction. 2
Remark 1. Note that in Case 1, that is for economies with excess supply,
whenever the number of agents in the economy is at least four and even,
we can easily adjust the proof without using duplication-invariance. Fur-
thermore, in Case 2, that is for economies with excess demand, we do not
need duplication-invariance for economies with at least four agents. It is an
open problem if duplication-invariance is independent of the other proper-
ties for economies with excess supply with an odd number of agents and for
economies with excess demand with three agents.
The proof of Theorem 2 (see also Remark 1) implies the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 1. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying Pareto optimality, no-envy, and
separability.
(i) For all N ∈ N and e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN such that |N | ≥ 4, |N | even, and
ΣNp(Ri) > Ω, ϕ(e) = U(e).
(ii) For all N ∈ N and e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN such that |N | ≥ 4 and ΣNp(Ri) >
Ω, ϕ(e) = U(e).
Next, we state the second of Chun’s (2001, Theorem 2) characterization
of the uniform rule.
Theorem 3. [Chun (2001), Theorem 2] The uniform rule is the only
rule satisfying Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, separability,
Ω-continuity, and replication-invariance.
The next observation will allow us to strengthen Theorem 3.
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Lemma 2. Pareto optimality, equal division lower bound, and separability
imply no-envy.
Proof. Let ϕ be a solution satisfying Pareto optimality, equal division
lower bound, and separability. Let e = (R,Ω) ∈ EN and x = ϕ(e). If
Ω =
∑
N p(Ri), by Pareto optimality, for all i ∈ N , ϕi(e) = p(Ri) and no-
envy is satisfied. Without loss of generality, we assume that Ω < ΣNp(Ri).
Suppose, by contradiction, that no-envy is violated. Then, there are two
agents, without loss of generality 1, 2 ∈ N , such that x2 P1 x1. By same-
sidedness, x1 < x2.
Let x¯ ≡ x1+x22 and e˜ = (R˜, Ω˜) be the economy obtained from e by defining
(a) R˜1 = R1, R˜2 = R2, for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}, p(R˜i) = x¯, and
(b) Ω˜ = |N | x¯.
Let x˜ = ϕ(e˜). Note that by (b), Ω˜|N | = x¯. Hence, by (a) and equal division
lower bound, for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}, x˜i = x¯. Thus,
∑
N\{1,2} x˜i = (|N | − 2) x¯
and x˜1 + x˜2 = 2 x¯ = x1 + x2. Hence, by separability, x˜1 = x1 and x˜2 = x2.
This implies x˜2 P˜1 x˜1.
If p(R˜1) ≥ x¯, then x˜1 < x¯ ≤ p(R˜1). Thus, by single-peakedness, x¯ P˜1 x˜1,
a contradiction to equal division lower bound.
If p(R˜1) < x¯, then p(R˜1) < x¯ < x˜2. Thus, by single-peakedness, x¯ P˜1 x˜2.
Hence, by x˜2 P˜1 x˜1 and transitivity, x¯ P˜1 x˜1, a contradiction to equal division
lower bound. 2
We can now state two more characterizations of the uniform rule. First,
we can drop replication-invariance from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2. The uniform rule is the only solution satisfying Pareto opti-
mality, equal division lower bound, separability, and Ω-continuity.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the uniform rule satisfies Pareto optimality, equal
division lower bound, separability, and Ω-continuity.
Let ϕ be a solution satisfying Pareto optimality, equal division lower
bound, separability, and Ω-continuity. Then, by Lemma 2, ϕ satisfies no-
envy. Hence, by Theorem 1, ϕ ≡ U . 2
Second, we can drop Ω-continuity from Theorem 3 and furthermore re-
place replication-invariance by the weaker duplication-invariance.
Corollary 3. The uniform rule is the only solution satisfying Pareto opti-
mality, equal division lower bound, separability, and duplication-invariance.
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Proof. By Lemma 1, the uniform rule satisfies Pareto optimality, equal
division lower bound, separability, and duplication-invariance.
Let ϕ be a solution satisfying Pareto optimality, equal division lower
bound, separability, and duplication-invariance. Then, by Lemma 2, ϕ sat-
isfies no-envy. Hence, by Theorem 2, ϕ ≡ U . 2
Remark 2. Since consistency (e.g., Thomson, 1994a) implies separability,
all our results still hold if we replace separability by consistency.
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